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VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE:
HARD TO FIND THE REAL RULES
Robert P. Mostellert
INTRODUCTION
This Comment has two major parts. Part I reviews some of the
developments in the law relating to victim impact evidence over the
last decade in light of my earlier predictions and hopes in this area.
Part II examines victim catharsis and its growing importance as ajusti-
fication for the receipt of victim impact evidence.
I
SEARCHING (PREDICTING, AND HOPING) IN VAIN FOR THE
GOOD NEWS IN VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
On some occasions, one has confidence in how future develop-
ments will unfold, makes predictions, and waits for later events to vali-
date (or refute) the predictions. On other occasions, one has a sense
of foreboding about how future events may unfold, but gives voice to
an alternative, more positive future, hoping to be proved a poor prog-
nosticator. Almost a decade ago, I wrote a short article for Criminal
Justice about the effect of victim impact evidence on the defense. I If I
was simply making predictions, I was rather consistently wrong; if I was
giving expression to my hopes, few of those have been realized.
I made several points in the article. One was to emphasize that
Payne v. Tennessee2 simply removed the per se Eighth Amendment bar
to receipt of victim impact evidence that Booth v. Maryland" and South
Carolina v. Gathers4 previously imposed.5 Payne did not hold that vic-
tim impact evidence was admissible, but rather made the question of
admissibility one of state law. 6 I noted that in some states, such evi-
dence was inadmissible as a matter of state law either through a judi-
cial rule or the death penalty statute, which contained an exclusive
t Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. M.P.P., Harvard University;J.D., Yale
Law School; B.A., University of North Carolina. I wish to thank Susan Bandes for her very
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Comment.
I Robert P. Mosteller, The Effect of Victim-Impact Evidence on the Defense, CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 1993, at 24.
2 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
3 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
4 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
5 Mosteller, supra note 1, at 24.
G See Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25; Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
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designation of aggravating factors, of which victim impact evidence
was not one.7 My analysis was accurate, but, as discussed below, state
law prohibitions have largely disappeared or have not been consid-
ered full bars to admission.
My example of judicial exclusion came from Georgia, which ex-
cluded victim impact evidence because the Georgia Supreme Court
held that it caused "confusion and prejudicial digression in sentenc-
ing. ''8 In short order, the state legislature undid the judicial exclusion
by making victim impact evidence admissible. 9
As to a designated system of aggravating factors that appeared
exclusive, I cited North Carolina and Arizona.10 North Carolina en-
acted no relevant legislation after Payne. Rather, it simply overlooked
the distinction I noted between Payne's removal of a federal constitu-
tional prohibition and explicit state law authorization to use victim
impact evidence. Without explaining the use of the evidence within
the state statutory structure, the North Carolina Supreme Court used
Payne's language, which provided the standard of the inadmissibility
of victim impact evidence under the Due Process Clause, to justify its
admissibility otherwise: "Victim-impact evidence is admissible in a cap-
ital sentencing proceeding unless the evidence 'is so unduly prejudi-
cial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.""' Similarly,
Arizona did not change its law with respect to victim impact evidence
after Payne. However, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that although
such evidence may not be used as an aggravating factor, it is admissi-
ble to rebut mitigating evidence.' 2
Not surprisingly, most states have taken the opportunity afforded
them by Payne to admit victim impact evidence. The count is roughly
as follows: of the thirty-seven jurisdictions that allow the death penalty,
thirty-one statutorily permit victim impact evidence. 13 Four states-
Connecticut, Montana, New Hampshire, and New York-have not de-
7 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
8 Sermons v. State, 417 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. 1992); see Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
9 See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-1.2 (1997). Georgia enacted the statutory change in
1993, one year after Sermons was decided. See Act of April 27, 1993, No. 570, § 2, 1993 GA.
LAwS 1660, 1662. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled the statute constitutional in Living-
ston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 751 (Ga. 1994). Livingston requires the state to give notice to
the defense of evidence that it intends to offer and to make a pretrial ruling on admissibil-
ity. Id. at 752. Later, in Turnerv. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1997), it further amplified the
procedural requirements on the presentation of the evidence (requiring, for example,
preparation of written victim impact statements) and developed a jury instruction forbid-
ding the use of the evidence to prove an aggravating factor. Id. at 842-43.
10 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
11 State v. Hooks, 548 S.E.2d 501, 510 (N.C. 2001) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1126 (2002).
12 See State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 55 (Ariz. 2001).
13 Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 154 (Pa. 2001).
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cided the issue.14 Mississippi limits its use to situations in which it is
necessary to establish relevant aggravating factors or to develop the
case. 1 5 Finally, one state, Indiana, excludes victim impact evidence
under an interpretation of its death penalty statute that limits admissi-
ble evidence to other specially defined factors. ' 6 Notably, most of the
states that impose and carry out the death penalty with the greatest
frequency authorize use of victim impact evidence.
17
In my earlier mispredictions, I also noted that victim impact evi-
dence was used less frequently at that time, a couple years after the
Payne decision, than one might have expected given the apparent ea-
gerness of jurisdictions to embrace harsh death penalty practices. 18 I
speculated that perhaps prosecutors were hesitant to use the evidence
because of its potential to induce overly emotional reactions and to
produce reversals of death penalties on appeal because of a violation
of due process or evidentiary principles. 19
I have no comprehensive statistics on the use of victim impact
evidence, but based on reported cases mentioning its use, admission
of victim impact evidence appears quite common in death penalty
cases. My suggestion that reversals might result from inflammatory
and emotional uses of such evidence has not proved true. For exam-
ple, in Cargle v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the victim impact evidence was beyond the statutory framework,
that it was overly emotional, and that its prejudicial impact clearly ex-
ceeded its probative value. z" Nonetheless, it found admission of the
evidence harmless because abundant evidence existed to support four
aggravating factors.
2 1
The willingness of this particular court to excuse even outrageous
victim impact evidence was demonstrated in a second case, Willingham
v. State.22 There, one of the murder victim's daughters stated:
"I think the only fair punishment for him is he should be con-
fined in a small area, someone three or four times his size should
come into that confined area and beat him, cause him pain. I think




17 See id. (listing California, Texas, and Florida as states that permit victim impact
evidence); DEBORAH FINs, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 28-29
(2002) (showing California, Texas, and Florida as the leading states in the number of pris-
oners on their death rows).
18 Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
19 Id.
20 909 P.2d 806, 829-30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
21 Id. at 834-35.
22 947 P.2d 1074 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shrum v. State,
991 P.2d 1032 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
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on his own blood. I think he should have to crawl, try to get away
from his attacker.
I think he should suffer, suffer, suffer, but you know, even if
he's put to death, he won't suffer, you know he will have a painless
death. We can't do anything to him that will cause him the kind of
pain that has been caused to our mother and to us ....
Mom has raised us to be kind and forgiving, but we can't for-
give this and we want him killed."
23
Despite this extraordinary statement, the court found that the victim
impact evidence had no effect and affirmed the death sentence.
2 4
I also spent a major portion of my earlier article discussing vari-
ous potential offsetting benefits to the defense from admission of vic-
tim impact evidence, which is typically very damaging.25 One such
benefit might be the expansion of ordinary discovery and "Brady re-
quirements" 2 6 on the prosecution to provide evidence impugning the
victim's character.27 However, from examining the reported cases, lit-
tle if anything seems to have materialized in this area. I also suggested
that admitting positive evidence about the victim could open the door
to the incredibly distasteful possibility of rebuttal by the defense with
negative information. 28 I have seen none of these rebuttals, which are
obviously very difficult to contemplate and would be even more diffi-
23 Id. at 1085 (alteration in original). The applicable Oklahoma statute defines per-
missible victim impact evidence to include "the victims' opinion of a recommended sen-
tence." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984 (Supp. 2001). The Oklahoma courts have found
this apparent violation of Booth's prohibition against admitting evidence of the survivor's
opinion as to sentence, which was not explicitly altered by Payne, see Mosteller, supra note 1,
at 25, constitutional. See Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 890-91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
The court in Ledbetter reasoned that, although Payne did not reach the issue directly, a fair
reading of that opinion demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment does not bar "character-
izations and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate punishment."
Id. at 890.
24 See Willingham, 947 P.2d at 1088-89. Because the defense attorney did not object at
trial, the error was directly reviewed under a plain error standard, but the court also re-
viewed the statements under its mandatory sentencing review to "determine whether the
statements caused Appellant to be sentenced to death for improper reasons." Id. at 1086.
The court affirmed because, remarkably, it concluded that "even absent the improper vic-
tim impact evidence, the result would have been the same." Id. at 1088-89. Despite appar-
ently strong reluctance to reverse based on misuse of victim impact evidence, reversals do
occur in extraordinarily outrageous cases. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891-93 (reversing
in part because the witness copied portions of the victim impact statement from Booth into
the statement which he read to the jury as his own).
25 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 28-29, 63. Even theoretically, these "benefits" were
usually no more than ways to diminish the harm rather than true benefits.
26 This reference refers to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny,
which require the prosecution to provide to the defense evidence in its possession material
to guilt or to sentencing. See generally Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1214-20 (2000) (discussing the scope of
Brady disclosure requirements).
27 Mosteller, supra note 1, at 29.
28 Id. at 63.
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cult to actually present. The mere possibility of such rebuttals cer-
tainly has not diminished the appetite for victim impact evidence.
The most likely explanation is that rebuttal rarely occurs because pros-
ecutors do not offer victim impact evidence when it would realistically
allow the defense to introduce negative character evidence not al-
ready known by the jury.
I suggested that admitting evidence about the impact of the
homicide on survivors might open the door to new types of mitigating
evidence for the defense.2 9 Because Payne did not challenge the im-
propriety of survivors' opinions that death was the appropriate sen-
tence, I argued, the Court's change in the law should not provide a
new basis to admit opinions of family members against the death pen-
alty.30 However, I suggested that by analogy, the defense might be
able to introduce evidence about the impact of the anticipated execu-
tion of the defendant on the defendant's family as a mitigating cir-
cumstance. 31 Predictably, such evidence has only gained the most
narrow of theoretical and actual footholds in death penalty law.32
Probably, the most significant recommendation for the defense
in the article was that the admission of victim impact evidence should
focus the defense on the victims and survivors of the crime. 33 As diffi-
cult as the contact may be, the greater general focus on the victim
resulting directly and indirectly from concern about the impact of the
crime on the victims and survivors should affect the defense as well.
Perhaps there are opportunities for healing; perhaps accommoda-
tions are possible. 34 Both in service of the client's interests, and be-
29 Id.
30 Id. at 28. Given that Oklahoma permits opinions by victims that death is the appro-
priate sentence, see supra note 23, it would logically follow that opinions in opposition to
death should also be admissible. However, elsewhere this general prohibition should re-
main unchanged.
31 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 63.
32 See Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution
Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 32-35 (1999) (arguing for
admission but recognizing that most, but not all, courts have rejected the constitutional
argument for admitting such evidence). State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 167-68 (Or. 1994)
and People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 505-06 (Cal. 1998) provide limited support for admissi-
bility in that they recognized that such evidence may be a reflection of the defendant's
character. Assuming admission of such evidence, one would expect it to have a less power-
ful effect on juries in the typical case than would victim impact evidence. The arguablyjust
(and arguably humanely achieved) termination of life would logically have a lesser impact
on the jury than evidence regarding the impact of an unjust and more sudden killing of
the victim.
33 See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 63.
34 Id. at 29. Finality through a plea and, as part of that process, acknowledgment of
the wrong that was done, are two possibilities for common ground for survivors and de-
fendants. Id.
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cause it is the humane thing to do, I suggested the defense attempt to
make contact and develop relationships with victims and survivors.3 5
One finds anecdotal evidence that such contacts take place. They
are almost always difficult, sometimes unsuccessful and even damag-
ing, but frequently helpful to ameliorate the degree of anger and
pain, if not to reach lasting reconciliation. Experienced death penalty
lawyers doubtless see that developing such contact helps to humanize
the stark adversarial battle of a death penalty trial.
36
Having looked back at some of the developments in victim im-
pact evidence, I want to now engage a new subject that may help
shape the future of victim impact evidence-the growing use of the
concept of victim catharsis to justify victim impact evidence.
II
SURVIVOR CATHARSIS AS AN EXPANDING BASIS FOR
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
In a recent criminal case in North Carolina, the prosecutor asked
the judge to permit the surviving daughter to speak at the completion
of a sentencing hearing at which life sentences were imposed.3 7 Fac-
ing the defendant, she said, "'I hope you live every day to regret eve-
rything you've done. It was something you took away that was
precious to us. Maybe one day God can forgive you, but I know I
couldn't.' "-
While this is not the type of statement that Payne would allow as
victim impact evidence, 39 it illustrates one aspect of victim statements
as they appear in noncapital sentences, in ad hoc accommodations in
the absence of the jury in capital cases, 40 and occasionally directly in
death penalty cases.4 1 I suspect victim catharsis is an implicit motiva-
35 Id.
36 My limited direct experience in death penalty litigation demonstrates that even the
contact between the victims' and defendants' families that can occur casually over the
course of protracted court hearings can ameliorate an image of the defendant as evil incar-
nate, an image which almost naturally flows from the criminal act and the defendant's
position as the accused. Families of defendants are human in a way that defendants do not
obviously appear to be. Maintaining an image of the wholly evil defendant is more difficult
when his or her family becomes known to victims and survivors.
37 See Resentencing Hr'g Tr. at 7-8, State v. Moore, No. 78 CRS 25577 (N.C. Super.
Ct. 2001).
38 Id. at 8.
59 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-27 (1991); Mosteller, supra note 1, at 25.
40 Mike Lee & Josh Shaffer, Rivas Given Death Penalty, Fr. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Aug. 30, 2001, at IA (describing how the widow of a slain officer demanded defendant
look at her and stated, "'The day that you die' . .. 'I'm going to be there to watch you die
just like you watched Aubrey [her husband] die"' at proceeding where judge imposed
death sentence earlier determined by the jury).
41 See Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting
statement of murder victim's daughter to the jury: "'Mom has raised us to be kind and
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tion behind the giving, and perhaps the receipt, of many victim im-
pact statements. What appears to be happening is an effort by the
survivor or victim to bring "closure" to an event; to have catharsis. I
want to address this victims' rights aspect of victim impact statements
in current practice and explain how some of those who support vic-
tims' rights hope to use the victims' desire to achieve catharsis to af-
fect the use of victim impact statements in the future.
42
In Payne, the Supreme Court reasoned that through prosecutorial
arguments and victim impact evidence "[a] State may legitimately con-
clude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the mur-
der on the victim's family is relevant to ... whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence
differently than other relevant evidence is treated.
4 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, thus justified ad-
mission as a matter of straightforward relevance. Elsewhere the Court
forgiving, but we can't forgive this and we want him killed,"' which was held to be error but
did not require reversal), overruled on other grounds by Shrum v. State, 991 P.2d 1032 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1999); supra note 23 and accompanying text.
42 In this limited Comment, I do not attempt to develop why I believe victim catharsis
is not an appropriate part of victim impact statements in death penalty cases. At one level,
the answer is that the Court in Payne gave no authorization for this use of such statements.
Fundamentally, I believe attempting to achieve catharsis through victim impact statements
is inherently incompatible with the reasonable arguments that can be developed to justify
receiving victim impact evidence in the process of determining whether to impose the
death penalty. It is incompatible with due process protections and analysis. Further, rec-
ognizing catharsis as a justification would make it virtually impossible to limit the improp-
erly prejudicial effect of victim impact statements.
I also do not undertake a detailed analysis of the benefit to victims from victim impact
statements. While I question whether the inherent constraints on such statements make
them congenial to achieving catharsis, I fully accept that a cathartic benefit can be gained
from a statement directed at a defendant and from other types of victim impact statements,
such as those which honor the lost loved one. I also recognize that (1) many victims want
to make such statements, (2) they sincerely believe that making the statement will provide
healing, and (3) some degree of healing does occur. Fundamentally, however, I question
whether victim impact statements directed at the defendant, or in other forms, very often
have a dramatic and lasting healing effect. I am persuaded that healing after a traumatic
loss of the magnitude of the homicide of a loved one is a long (indeed, for many, unend-
ing) process in which no one event, be it an effective victim impact statement or even the
execution of the defendant, provides anything approaching "closure." See generallyJUDITH
LEWis HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1997) (discussing disorders related to and the
stages of recovery following traumatic events). Although all these questions are beyond the
scope of this Comment, and may indeed be beyond our current analytical and scientific
capacities, my general view is that if we had the chance to lift the due process bar on the
receipt of victim impact statements made in a death penalty case solely for the cathartic
benefit of a survivor, the anticipated benefit of catharsis would clearly be insufficient to
justify the change. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the
Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605-06 (2000) (discussing the differences
between needs of victims and what the legal system can and should provide); infra notes
52-61 and accompanying text (discussing a proposed victims' rights amendment to the
U.S. Constitution).
4" 501 U.S. at 827.
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made similar arguments: "[A] State may properly conclude that for
the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness, it should have . . . evidence of the specific harm
caused by the defendant."44 Such evidence may be part of the "infor-
mation necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-de-
gree murder."45 The majority opinion also defended admission of
such evidence on the grounds of adversarial fairness in death penalty
litigation: First, the Court noted that the state has a legitimate interest
in counteracting the defense's mitigating evidence, which individual-
izes the defendant, by showing that "'so too the victim is an individual
whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his
family."46 Second, "turning the victim into a 'faceless stranger' . . .
deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence.' 47 The Court
made general arguments of relevance and effectiveness of proof, but
did not suggest the motivation to help heal and restore the survivors.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, provided a glimpse
into a broader victims' rights justification for victim impact evidence.
She stated, "'Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization.' It
transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse,
thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person.
The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that
back."48 The argument is styled in terms of returning something to
the murder victims themselves, but obviously that action is symbolic.
Its impact is for the benefit of the victims' families and friends, but
even injustice O'Connor's concurring opinion, the justification is not
stated or justified as one of catharsis for the survivors and victims.
As everyone is no doubt aware, a powerful victims' rights move-
ment has developed over the last two decades. The influence and im-
pact of the national movement was clearly felt in the Payne decision.
49
One of the major results of the movement has been the enactment of
44 Id. at 825.
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted)).
47 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
48 Id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting the Brief ForJustice For All Political
Committee, a victims' rights group (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
49 Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Booth's stunning ipse dixit, that a crime's unantic-
ipated consequences must be deemed 'irrelevant' to the sentence, conflicts with a public
sense ofjustice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' move-
ment." (citation omitted)). See generally Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Re-
flection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21, 44-60 (1992) (arguing that
Payne represents a step back for victims' rights groups because it invites defense attorneys
to prove that the victim was of dubious moral character).
[Vol. 88:543
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victims' rights amendments to the constitutions of over thirty states. 50
Such enactments have affected the admissibility of victim impact evi-
dence in death penalty cases. For example, in ruling victim impact
evidence constitutional and admissible, the supreme courts of Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey each cited its state's victims' rights amend-
ment as a critical component in its decision. 51
The most interesting view into the thinking of those who aggres-
sively pursue the victims' rights cause as a method of altering criminal
procedure practices can, however, be seen in the Victims' Rights
Amendment proposed for the U.S. Constitution. The latest version of
that proposed Amendment was introduced in April 2002.52 Among
the rights to be guaranteed to crime victims by the proposed Amend-
ment was the right "to be heard at public.., sentencing... proceed-
ings."53  In 1999, a substantively similar version of the proposed
Amendment and this guarantee 54 was approved by the Senate Judici-
50 Mary Margaret Giannini, Note, The Swinging Pendulum of Victims'Rights: The Enforce-
ability ofIndiana's Victims' Rights Laws, 34 IND. L. REv. 1157, 1157 n.2 (2001) (listing thirty-
two states that have victims' rights amendments).
51 In State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found its victim impact statute constitutional, stating:
Our State Constitution explicitly provides victims of crimes with more rights
than the Federal Constitution. The Victim's Rights Amendment expressly
authorizes the Legislature to provide crime victims with "those rights and
remedies" as it determines are necessary. Even if we were inclined to di-
verge from the holding in Payne and interpret the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause of our State Constitution as providing greater protections
against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, the text of the New
Jersey Constitution demands that we not pursue such an independent
course ....
... To hold the victim impact statute unconstitutional would require
us to ignore the Victim's Rights Amendment and the will of the electorate
that overwhelmingly approved the constitutional amendment .... [T]he
people of New Jersey, speaking through the Legislature, have repeatedly
expressed a very strong "public attitude" that victims should be provided
with more rights.
Id. at 174. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in finding its state's victim impact practice constitutional, stated:
Crime victims are to be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitiv-
ity, and their rights are to be vigorously protected and defended. Crime
victims have a basic bill of rights guaranteeing their input in sentencing
matters, their right to restitution, and information on the potential release
from custody of their assailants. Such aggressive intent to protect the rights
of crime victims and involve them in the sentencing process favors the in-
clusion of victim impact testimony in capital cases.
Id. at 157 (citation omitted).
52 See S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 91, 107th Cong. (2002).
53 S.J. Res. 35, § 2; H.R.J. Res. 91, § 2.
54 Under earlier versions of the amendment, the right was described in somewhat
different language: it provided that a victim of crime has a right "to be heard, if present,
and to submit a statement at all such proceedings to determine.., a sentence." S.J. Res. 3,
106th Cong., § 1 (1999); S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong., § 1 (1998). It is impossible to deter-
mine whether the change in language was intended to modify the arguments about the
cathartic justification for victim impact statements intended by the drafters, but there is no
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ary Committee, which prepared a formal report that analyzed its pur-
pose and effect.
55
Unlike Payne, which merely permitted states to admit victim im-
pact statements,5 6 the Amendment would require their admission. In
its section-by-section analysis, the Majority Report explained further:
[C]rime victims have the right to be heard at any proceeding to
determine a "sentence." This provision guarantees that victims will
have the right to "allocute" at sentencing. Defendants have a consti-
tutionally protected interest in personally addressing the court.
This provision would give the same rights to victims, for two inde-
pendent reasons. First, such a right guarantees that the sentencing
court orjury will have full information about the impact of a crime,
along with other information, in crafting an appropriate sentence.
The victim would be able to provide information about the nature
of the offense, the harm inflicted, and the attitude of the offender.
Second, the opportunity for victims to speak at sentencing can
sometimes provide a powerful catharsis. Because the right to speak
is based on both of these grounds, a victim will have the right to be
heard even when the judge has no discretion in imposing a
mandatory prison sentence.
State and Federal statutes already frequently provide allocution
rights to victims. The Federal amendment would help to ensure
that these rights are fully protected. The result is to enshrine in the
Constitution the Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee, rec-
ognizing the propriety of victim testimony in capital proceedings.
... At the same time, the victim's right to be heard at sentencing
will not be unlimited, just as the defendant's right to be heard at
sentencing is not unlimited today. Congress and the States remain
free to set certain limits on what is relevant victim impact testimony.
For example, ajurisdiction might determine that a victims' views on
the desirability or undesirability of a capital sentence is not relevant
in a capital proceeding. The Committee does not intend to alter or
comment on laws existing in some States allowing for victim opin-
ion as to the proper sentence.
5 7
indication of any such intent. The most authoritative analysis of intention is found in the
2000 Senate judiciary Report described infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
55 S. REP. No. 106-254 (2000) [hereinafter Majority Report] (relating to S.J. Res. 3).
Together with my colleague, Jeff Powell, I have previously discussed various aspects of this
report, but principally focused on other provisions. See Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson
Powell, With Disdain for the Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment, 78
N.C. L. REv. 371 (2000).
56 501 U.S. 808, 824-27 (1991).
57 Majority Report, supra note 55, at 32-33 (citations omitted). Earlier, in a section of
the Report describing the need for specific rights, the Majority also discusses its view of the
two purposes of victim statements: providing helpful information and catharsis. Id. at
14-22. The latter purpose was supported in the testimony of Professor Paul Cassell, quot-
ing an abuse victim's description of her statement to the defendant "'tell[ing] him how
much he hurt me."' Id. at 19.
[Vol. 88:543
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If this view of victims' rights were made part of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, obviously changes would occur in the use of victim impact state-
ments in capital sentencing. Although catharsis may be seen as
playing a relatively minor role in sentencing practices now, it would
become one of the two officially recognized bases for admitting victim
information and statements. The claim of catharsis would be a suffi-
cient justification for the admission of such statements absent an af-
firmative legislative judgment that the subject matter being discussed
was not to be considered in sentencing as a matter of relevance. How-
ever, a determination that the information would have no effect
would not render it inadmissible.
Clearly, jurisdictions would be authorized to follow Oklahoma's
lead51 to determine that victims' opinions on sentencing are relevant.
Under such circumstances, not only would allowing those victims pre-
sent to speak and those absent to present a statement, including a
videotaped statement,59 be constitutionally permissible, it would be a
constitutional obligation. The Majority Report explicitly stated that
some limitations are intended, as a victim's right to be heard is not
unlimited. 60 Such limitations would presumably include violations of
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, which is not ex-
plicitly trumped, or the testimony going entirely too far in terms of
the number of presentations. 61 Nevertheless, more evidence and
statements, whatever the form, would be admissible.
CONCLUSION
Having so poorly predicted the future and thus fulfilling my
hopes, I will not venture any prediction on how the limitations some
jurisdictions now place on victim impact evidence may shape the fu-
ture. I do not have sufficient experience to know whether any are very
effective in constraining the most common misuses of victim impact
evidence or in preventing its introduction from having the arbitrary
impact on capital sentencing predicted at the time Booth, Gathers, and
Payne were decided. Also, I do not know how large the impact of such
58 See supra notes 22-23.
59 Majority Report, supra note 55, at 34 (indicating that "written" was intentionally not
used to modify "statement" so that the term would encompass victims who desired to pre-
sent a videotaped statement).
60 Id. at 33-34.
61 S.J. Res. 3 allowed for exceptions "only when necessary to achieve a compelling
interest." S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong., § 3 (1999). The following is an example of such an
exception: "[R]estrictions on the number of persons allowed to present oral statements
might be appropriate in rare cases involving large numbers of victims." Majority Report,
supra note 55, at 41. S.J. Res. 35 would allow restrictions "dictated by a substantial interest
in public safety or the administration of criminal justice, or by compelling necessity," S.J.
Res. 35, 107th Cong., § 2 (2002), which would presumably anticipate a similar restriction.
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evidence is on the outcome in the typical case, 62 as opposed to those
cases in which other especially powerful evidence is introduced.63
With these caveats and great caution, my conclusion is that none
of the solutions is very effective, and the courts are generally reticent
to remedy even serious departures from established rules and appro-
priate practices. As I see it, the basic problem is that victim impact
evidence is inherently uncontrollable. There are no real rules be-
cause there cannot be effective control of this type of evidence. In
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Paul Newman disabled his oppo-
nent with a low blow while supposedly discussing the rules of their
upcoming knife fight. His opponent, dropping his guard, asked in-
credulously, "Rules? ... In a knife fight? '64 Both men understood in
different ways that knife fights and rules are simply incompatible.
Real rules for victim impact evidence seem to me equally
incompatible.
I also see the beginnings of a shift in the use of victim impact
evidence from providing information to the sentencing court to seek-
ing catharsis or closure. Society, in a pop-psychology-way, appears to
have embraced the propriety of statements directed at defendants for
the purpose of helping to heal the victim. For this purpose, the im-
pact evidence becomes even more visceral and even more difficult to
constrain using ordinary rules of due process, probativity versus
prejudice, relevance, and reasonableness. The knife fight analogy be-
comes even stronger, and the difficulty of applying rules to that type
of inherently lawless enterprise becomes even more difficult. I hope
this is not where we are now heading with victim impact evidence in
death penalty cases.
62 Early empirical studies in experimental situations suggest that such impact would
be substantial. See Susan Bancles, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim impact
Statements, 1999 UTAii L. REV. 545, 550-51 (describing empirical studies).
63 For an example of extremely powerful evidence, see ABC Primetime Live: You Shot the
Wrong Girl (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 13, 1997) (showing videotaped victim impact
evidence created and introduced by critically injured wife of homicide victim that helped
secure death penalty for defendant Randy Garcia in his California capital trial).
64 BUTCH CASSIDY AND TriE SUNDANCE KID (Twentieth Century Fox 1969).
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